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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine India’s role in the politics of a specific climate change mitigation policy 
called “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries (REDD+)”. It explores India’s strategic behaviour towards the development of REDD 
policy. The paper argues that India had pushed for the remodelling of the global REDD negotiations by 
expanding its scope to conservation activities, which entails more direct benefits for India. This is largely due 
to differences in India’s rates of forest cover and deforestation as compared to high forest - high 
deforestation countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. To substantiate its argument, the paper uses the main 
underpinnings of relative gains theory in international relations and applies them toward interpreting India’s 
behaviour in negotiating REDD+ at global level. Further, the paper analyses the Indian strategies used to 
remodel the REDD mechanism using insights from soft power theory and its more recent amendments. 
Thematic analysis of the REDD-relevant documents as well as exploratory expert interviews have been 
employed for showing India’s proactive role in the politics of REDD+. It is concluded that India indeed played 
a central role in critical past decisions, which lead to re-shaping REDD due to relative gains concerns and 
mainly by means of soft power strategies.   
Keywords: REDD+; India; international governance; relative gains; soft power; forest cover change; forest 
management; forest policy; deforestation rates; forest carbon stocks 
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change has strongly dominated international forest and related environmental 
governance since the past 30 years (Singer and Giessen, 2017; Sahide et al., 2015; Giessen, 2013; 
Giessen et al., 2014). In the recent times, the clout of emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (the BRICs) have come to the forefront of the climate change negotiations (Tan, 
2014) and with the rise of the BRICs, the negotiation power in the system of climate governance has 
become more diffused (Jang et al., 2016). 
India, in particular, has emerged as one of the key actors in global climate politics under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Vihma, 2011; Atteridge et al., 
2012). India’s per capita GHG emissions are among the lowest in the world however, when 
accounted in total tonnes, India stands tall at being the fourth largest GHG emitter globally (Olivier 
et al., 2017). Given this dichotomy, India has very proactively positioned itself around the climate 
change discourse (Atteridge et al., 2012).  
Within global climate governance and among all other negotiations, a forest-specific 
mechanism has been negotiated as a central component of a post-Kyoto climate agreement 
(Lövbrand, 2009; Humphreys, 2006; 2008; Nijnik and Bizikova, 2008). It is called “Reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks in developing 
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countries (REDD+1)”. The evolving REDD+ programme provides positive financial incentives to help 
developing countries reduce their deforestation rates (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012; Schoene and 
Bernier, 2011; Pistorius et al. 2012). REDD+ can be seen as an offset scheme within carbon markets 
that will generate carbon credits. These credits, in turn, are supposed to compensate for carbon 
emissions and could be used (mainly by industrialised countries) to meet emission targets and to be 
traded in carbon markets. The REDD+ mechanism in its course of evolvement has witnessed many 
stages of development among which the most significant shift was marked by a reformulation of a 
former REDD mechanism (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) to the 
REDD+ mechanism (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries) (Humphreys, 2008). India is said to have played a 
proactive role in bringing this shift in the REDD regime (Sud et al., 2012). Against this background, 
we make an attempt to analyse the motivation for India to become a key player in REDD negotiations 
at the intersection of global forest and climate politics. The paper also aims at understanding the 
strategies adopted by India for expanding the scope of REDD to compensate for forest conservation 
activities.  
This article largely follows a neorealist line of argumentation suggesting that it is the self-
interests of a state that makes it concerned about the benefits it can extract from global agreements 
in comparison to the competing states, thus accumulating and exerting power in the pursuit of their 
own interests (Grieco, 1988). With this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature on global forest-
related climate politics which has so far ignored the relative gains perspective to understand the 
cooperation among countries. 
The paper is guided by two core prepositions derived from the theoretical accounts of neo-
realism, which are discussed in section 2. The assumptions are: 
• India, during the REDD negotiations, acted responsive to the relative gains concern associated 
with REDD and exhibited relative-gain seeking behaviour in the negotiations by strongly 
advocating for adding the favourable notion of “plus” to the global agenda and REDD diplomacy. 
• India used soft power strategies to achieve its goal of remodelling REDD into REDD+. 
2. Theoretical propositions 
2.1. Relative gains theory and its relevance in global REDD politics 
In recent times, climate change and related REDD issues have become high-politics (Motaal, 
2010) as opposed to low politics, under which all other environmental issues may be subsumed 
(Willets, 2001). This is reflected by the inclusion of climate issues in the high level segments of COPs, 
G-8+5 and G-20 negotiations (Volger and Stephan, 2009). Nation-states increasingly behave in a 
more realist manner with regard to climate change as a global issue.  
The issue of climate change has made its way up to the level of high-politics in the international 
system (Volger and Stephan, 2009) because of its impact not only on most developing countries but 
also on businesses and national economies (Willets, 2001). Thus, owing to the high politics nature 
of climate change, participating governments are likely to use a realist approach to secure their own 
interests while engaging in the discourse (Morgenthau, 1956). From a neo-realist perspective, states 
are inherently inclined to strive for relative advantage against other states on the international 
scene (Luttwak, 1990). Although a realist state is expected to focus on its own interest in any co-
operation or collaboration with other countries, it not only focuses on its absolute gain (Mosher, 
2003), but is also concerned about the gains of the other states involved in the co-operation, as any 
relative gain to other states may threaten a state’s status in an international system (Keohane, 1998). 
Neo-realist scholars argue that this concern with relative gain is significant enough to inhibit 
international co-operation to a great extent (Grieco, 1988; Powell, 1991). However, Snidal (1991a) 
argues that states sometimes do exhibit relative gain-seeking behaviour, which does not necessarily 
have a significant general inhibiting effect on international cooperation. 
                                                      
1 Later in the text, “plus” is used as interchangeable with “+” 
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Under relative gain-seeking behaviour, a state tends to limit the range of viable cooperative 
agreements and is reluctant to co-operate because no state will accept deals that provide 
disproportionately greater benefits to others (Snidal, 1991a). This argument is supported by the 
conflict between Brazil and India in the context of REDD+. Both states held extreme positions during 
the REDD negotiations at the COP-152 summit because there was a clear conflict of interest. REDD 
was initially introduced to compensate countries with high deforestation rates such as e.g. Brazil 
and Indonesia. However, with the inclusion of “plus” in the acronym REDD, it is more likely that 
REDD funds will be used to reward countries that have managed to maintain and enhance their 
carbon stocks (for e.g. India and China), which would significantly dwarf the amount of funds 
generated for halting deforestation in the first place (Potvin and Bovarnik, 2008).  
Snidal (1991b, similar Wibowo and Giessen, 2015 for REDD+ in Indonesia, Giessen and Sahide 
2017 on ASEAN forest and environmental policy) states that if distribution is the main relative-gain 
concern, then states will alter the terms of a cooperative agreement. In case of REDD, India did just 
that by putting the “plus” on the REDD agenda. The relative gains in the REDD context include 
monetary benefits in the form of REDD funds and the underlying goal of India associated with REDD 
politics (that is, enhancing its potential to emerge as a leader in global climate politics by showing 
its newly acquired power in world politics and changing its image from that of a deal-breaker to a 
deal-maker in climate change politics). 
2.2. Soft power theory and its relevance in REDD plus policy discourse 
The broad definition of soft power comes from international relations theory and refers to 
accomplishing international aims through persuasion and co-option (Vibert, 2008).The soft power 
theory has clearly become a growth point in research of international relations (Breslin, 2011). 
Joseph Nye (1990) first coined the term and defined it as “the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments... Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” (Nye, 2004a : p.12) 
Nye (2004b) argues that a state’s soft power refers to its ability to achieve its goals in an 
international system through persuasion, primarily via political ideas and norms and co-option, 
rather than using “hard” military power. 
Guenn Lee (2009), however, expanded Nye’s soft power definition and took the concept 
beyond the mere distinction between coercive (hard) power with co-optive (soft) power. Instead, 
he emphasised the use of non-material ‘soft resources’ to generate soft power, which, he claimed, 
can be both co-optive and coercive, depending on the use of soft resources.  
Another power concept put forth in the field of forest policy studies is actor-centred power 
(Krott et al., 2014), according to which the power a political actor possesses can empirically be 
observed in form of dominant information, (dis-)incentives, and coercion through the threat or use 
of force. The concept has recently been further developed, esp. regarding the developments of 
power dynamics over time as well as issue-specific power resources as opposed to more general 
power concepts from international relations (Prabowo et al., 2016; 2017; Maryudi and Sahide, 2017; 
Rahman et al., 2016; 2018; Rahman and Giessen, 2016; Giessen et al., 2016; Sarker et al., 2017). 
When contrasting this concept with soft power it becomes obvious that soft power focuses on the 
former two observable forms, while hard power mainly concerns coercion. In addition, the actor-
centred power concept is better capable of capturing very detailed, issue-specific power capabilities, 
which grand theories are likely to miss out on. 
The use of power by the egoist state to secure its self-interest in an international system is 
supported by the neorealist paradigm (Kamminga, 2010) thus, it is interesting to understand what 
power strategies a state adopts while pursuing its interest when the issue is not related to national 
security per se but to the global issue of climate change. 
As highlighted previously, climate change politics provides an immense scope for states to use 
‘soft power’ strategies to position themselves to structure this debate. 
                                                      
2 The UNFCCC Conference of parties held in Copenhagen in 2009 
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India, like other major global powers, has focused on the soft power approach lately (Lee, 2010; 
Purushothanam, 2010) and its foreign policy emphasises inter-governmental co-operation, 
negotiated settlements and economic collaboration (Wagner, 2010). India has been a defensive soft 
power (Wagner, 2005; Das, 2013), i.e., not using soft power to exert influence but mainly to build 
its image. In the context of REDD, however, India aimed to include incentives for conservation & for 
the enhancement of carbon stocks and effectively used ‘soft power’ to mobilise the support of other 
countries in its demand to be accepted at the negotiation table. 
3. Methodological approach 
The research inquiry for this paper has been addressed using a qualitative research design. The 
qualitative analysis focused primarily on India’s pro-active and strategic behaviour in the 
development of REDD discourse. It combines the methods of document analysis with 
supplementary expert interviews. Document analysis is a qualitative research technique. It allows 
the researcher to systematically evaluate the printed and electronic material and interpret the 
meaning around the text relevant to the topic of research (Bowen, 2009).  
For carrying out the document analysis, the text documents, which were deemed most relevant 
to our research objective were identified and selected. Although India has prepared many 
documents (reports, policy briefs, comment-based reports, etc) for directly communicating with the 
UNFCCC through structured meetings of Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA)3, 
our analysis focused on reports which were directly relating to REDD policy or documents that 
substantially reflect and disseminate India’s stance on the REDD issue. The main documents that 
were included in the analysis are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Categories of documents analysed in the paper. In brackets: Number of documents 
considered in the analysis. For details see Annex 1. 
Source Document type Communicated with Focus on 
MoEF (8) Statement/views report 
(2) 
UNFCCC, SBSTA and AWG-
LCA (4) 
Defending REDD+ as 






Technical report (2 ) Media (2) Highlighting India’s stand on 
the REDD debate (6) 
 Official submission to the 
UNFCCC (1) 
Indian parliament (1) Promoting India’s pro-
conservation approach in 
forest management (2) 
 Others (5) International meeting 
(1) 
REDD+ financing (2) 
  National communication 
(2) 
Reiterating India’s interest in 
REDD+ (7) 
 
The numbers within brackets reveal the number of documents analysed under each category. 
A total of 10 documents (see Annex 1) were selected for the analysis. The numbers in the fourth 
column of the above table are overlapping based on the prominent focus of the document. 
For triangulating the data, we conducted key informant interviews. Our key informants were 
the two experts: one was intensively involved at the domestic level with the Indian government’s 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) at the intersection of global and domestic REDD+ 
discourses in India. Another key informant is a World Bank’s senior negotiator of global carbon 
issues, closely linked to REDD+ policymaking at the international level. Interviews and subsequent 
personal correspondence with the two experts provided first-hand information on India’s stance in 
                                                      
3 The SBSTA counsels the Conference of the Parties  (COP) on matters of climate change related policy 
issues and technical discussions on suitable methods) or other international meetings on emission 
trading/climate change (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011) 
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REDD politics from a domestic and an international perspective and helped validate data from the 
document analysis. 
 
Table 2: Operationalizing the study from codes to themes in document analysis. 
 
The iterative process of analysing documents involved two steps. First, the information 
generated by the documents was organized into categories related to the main line of research 
inquiry. The second step was to conduct thematic analysis. As the name suggests, thematic analysis 
involves identification of themes by carefully re-reading and reviewing the data (Rice & Ezzy, 1999), 
and recognizing the pattern across the data, followed by a ‘comprehensive process of data coding’ 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006:4).  Fundamentally, thematic analysis establishes an analytical 
foundation to understand an issue on any social or political dimension and interpret it by exploring 
the salience of important themes in a text (Attride-Stirling, 2001).  
 
 Codes generated Main issues discussed  Themes identified  
1 Pro-Conservation policy approach Scope of afforestation and 
reforestation (A&R) activities in 
climate change mitigation; 
Increase in forest cover; 
Compensation/incentive to increase 
forest cover 
India proposed REDD+ 
mechanism 
2 




Opportunity cost of increased forest 
cover 
5 Compensated conservation REDD funds for sustainable 
management of forests 
Monetary benefit for the conservation 
of forest and carbon stock 
India discarded REDD that 
only focused on 
deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
6 Operationalisation of REDDplus 
7 
Unit of Carbon saved=Unit of carbon 
added 
8 
India in COPs (Bali to Cancun) and 
other international meetings related 
to REDD 
Promotion of REDD-Plus 
Seeking alliance 
Improving its international visibility 
 
India advancing its own 
interest by emphasising the 
“plus” in REDD. 
 9 
India’s written submission to the 
UNFCCC 
10 
C-sequestration from India’s forests 
and tree cover 
Promotion of self-image as pro-
conservation and proactive in forests 
and climate change issue. 
India used its soft power to 
pursue the REDD-Plus 
proposal on formal policy 
agreement on REDD. 
11 Diversity of ecosystems in India 
12 Statistics on India’s forest cover 
14 India hosting CBD COP-2012 
15 Green India Mission India’s new domestic and international 
initiatives related to forests and 
climate change 
16 REDDplus partnership 
17 
New terms like Sustainable 
management of forests (SMF), 
compensated conservation, etc. 
Initiation of new technical terms 
gained support for India from forestry 
networks such as UNEP, UN-FAO, etc. 
and facilitated India’s proposal at the 
negotiation table.  
18 The “Plus” in the REDD-Plus proposal 
Structural circulation of   REDD-Plus 
proposal through political discourses 
aligned to its allies (e.g., China) and 
friendly international organisations 
(UNFCCC, UN-FAO, UNEP etc).  
Structural circulation means that India 
proposed its idea of 'compensated 
conservation' in context of REDD to 
incorporate the “plus” component in 
REDD at various meetings and at 
various levels.  
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The key informant interviews were transcribed, followed by the identification of the most 
relevant text segments from the selected documents for this study (see Annexure 1). After the 
careful reading of the text data, broad items of interest were identified based on the core 
assumptions of the paper, for example, India’s intervention in the REDD discourse, India’s stance on 
the proposed REDD mechanism since 2005 till 2010 and if and how it has changed subsequently etc. 
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The next step involved establishing the coding system. A total of 18 codes (see Table 2) were 
derived based on the: 
a) Recurrent issues appeared in the data regarding the REDD and REDD+ mechanisms; 
b) Recurrent issues appeared in the data regarding India vis-à-vis the REDD+ mechanism; 
c) Specific theoretical interests regarding the means and strategies employed by India to pursue its 
interests in the REDD discourse. 
 
Table 3: Definition of basic themes (as a part of the thematic analysis process) 
Basic Themes Definition / contextual meaning 
India’s responsiveness to relative 
gains concern 
 
India made sure to convey its point of view to the global climate 
change community and all the parties to the UNFCCC by reiterating its 
REDD alternative proposal called ‘compensated conservation’. 
India actively participated in the 
REDD discourse 
 
Indian delegates participated in every meeting of the UN and others 
with one frame of mind to propagate India’s moral arguments asking 
for financial rewards to countries that have increased forest cover and 
thus carbon stocks in the past. 
 
India sought alliances in the form 
of BASIC coalition during COP-15 
in 2009. 
 
In Copenhagen, a newly formed group of advanced developing 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China: BASIC) emerged, and 
India is said to have played a pivotal role in its formation. 
 
India promoted “Plus” in the REDD 
mechanism. 
 
India’s continuous submissions on REDD, reiterating the same 
argument of compensated conservation, to the UNFCCC since COP 11 
in 2005 
India’s submission of its own 
REDD-Plus proposal to the 
UNFCCC 
One of the most important submissions by India on REDD that was 
welcomed by the UNFCCC at COP-13 in Bali. The official decision of 
COP 13 for the first time included in the REDD negotiation text ‘ … the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 




India used its network not only with the other countries but also with 
inter-governmental bodies such as UNEP and FAO to market its rather 
innovative and win-win approach for the REDD mechanism. 
 
Creation and promotion of Self-
image 
 
India has promoted its pro-conservation approach and willingness to 
curb emissions in all its domestic and international communications 
very well, where it claimed to increase its forest cover in the recent 
past and had adopted pro-conservation strategies and policies at the 
domestic level to engage in afforestation and reforestation activities. 
 
Leadership from the outside-in 
 
India took over the discussion from its counterparts, for example 
Brazil and China, on issues related to REDD. Additionally, it effectively 





Currently, India is seen to be actively engaged in strategic partnerships 
with large economies such as the US and EU, along with China, Brazil 
and South Africa in bilateral and trilateral partnerships. 
 
Shift in geo-political focus from G-
77 to G-20 and G-8plus5 
India has always been a significant partner in the G-77; however, it has 
now shown a very clear intention to align its interests with a smaller 
but powerful group of countries. 
 
These three foci were then combined, and, by reading through the text segments, the most 
salient constructs in the documents were identified and refined into a finite set of discrete and 
meaningful codes. The coding eased and clarified the recognition of relevant pieces of information 
and simplified the filtering and reduction of the data for further analysis. In Table 2, we show the 
main elements identified in the REDD+ documents consulted in the research, which were further 
combined to identify broad themes in context of India vis-à-vis REDD+.  
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Once Table 2 was created, the text segments in the data were revisited to further identify ‘basic 
themes’. These basic themes were generally identified as the first order of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set in relation to the research hypotheses (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
At this stage, each basic theme was given a concise definition, which are described in Table 3. 
The basic themes were then trawled back to data (texts) and were defined and contextualised, 
hence the construction of each basic theme is checked and re-checked for explanatory power.  
Further, by carefully examining the texts, the basic themes were grouped into clusters of 
categories to summarise the overall meanings. They are called ‘organising themes’. Finally, the 
super-ordinate theme that fairly encapsulated the principal rhetoric in the texts emerged as the 
‘global theme’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Figure 1 shows the prominent basic themes identified in the 
analysis of the REDD documents consulted in the research, which were further combined to identify 
the organising themes in context of India vis-à-vis REDD+ and then were further amalgamated to 
the broad global theme, in keeping with the core assumptions of this paper. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
4.1. India’s interest in the “Plus” of REDD 
Figure 2:  The history of REDDplus negotiations (adapted from Holloway and Giandomenico, 2009: 
4). 
 
Official documents generated by the MoEF on issues related to the forest’s role in climate 
change mitigation clearly reflect India’s support for financial incentives such as REDD and the clean 
development mechanism (Gundimeda, 2004). In the context of REDD, India seemed to have 
maintained a clear position on compensating countries for the carbon sequestration provided by 
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their forest cover. At COP 12, 2006 in Nairobi, India proposed “compensated conservation4” as a 
new policy approach in REDD discourse, providing a new perspective and momentum to the REDD 
negotiation in the international arena (MoEF, 2010). India continued to emphasize on compensated 
conservation policy in the context of reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries 
during the second UNFCCC SBSTA workshop in Cairns in 2007 (Kishwan, 2007). This new policy 
approach puts emphasis on compensating the countries for maintaining and increasing carbon pools 
of their forests as a result of conservation and increase/improvement in forest cover backed by a 
verifiable monitoring system. During all the negotiations happening at an international level (see 
Figure 2), India never opposed the REDD concept. However, from time to time it continued to 
emphasize that reduction of deforestation and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks are two 
sides of the same coin (MoEF, 2010), thus should be treated equally whenever the mechanism is 
operationalized in the future.  
India advocated for compensated conservation approach by using the argument of justice and 
equity.  The emphasis was made on rewarding countries that have taken strong steps in the past 
to halt deforestation and promote forest conservation (Pant, 2009). Following is an excerpt from 
one of the documents that highlights India’s quest to seek compensation for conservation. (excerpt 
from “views of India to UNFCCC on REDD”, 3):   
“Protection and sustainable management of forests need to be considered as positive 
practices to avoid deforestation. Nations with continued deforestation and now committing 
to reduce deforestation rates, and those having already taken up strong conservation 
measures and thereby stabilizing and increasing the forest cover … present a fit case to be 
rewarded under REDD, as these efforts reduce the emission of carbon in atmosphere/capture 
atmospheric carbon, in the process.  
In the REDD discourse, some concerns were floating that the distribution of benefits may be 
unequal among the participating countries5depending on the choice of scope, reference level, 
distribution, and funding mechanism of a given proposal (Parker et al., 2008). Da Fonseca et al. (2007) 
claimed that countries with historically high deforestation rates will gain more from REDD, for 
example, Brazil and Indonesia. Table 4 shows four categories of developing countries developed by 
Da Fonseca et al. (2007) based on countries forest cover and deforestation rates.  
 
Table 4. Matrix of countries by their levels of forest cover and historical rates of deforestation, 
adapted after Da Fonseca et al. (2007). 
                                                      
4 It is a policy approach proposed by India which provides financial incentives to the countries for 
maintaining and increasing their forests as a result of conservation. 
5 Participating countries here refer to all those developing countries that will host REDD+ activities as part of 
the climate change mitigation policy 
 
 




( > 0.22%/yr) 
Quadrant I 
E.g., Madagascar, Thailand 
High potential for benefits from reducing 
emissions from deforestation 
High potential for benefits from 
reforestation activities and CDM  
Quadrant III 
E.g., Brazil, Indonesia 
High potential for benefits from 
reducing emissions from deforestation 
Low potential for benefits from 




( < 0.22%/yr) 
Quadrant II  
E.g., India, China, South Africa 
Low potential for benefits from reducing 
emissions from deforestation 
High potential for benefits from 
reforestation activities and CDM 
Quadrant IV 
E.g., Suriname Gabon 
Low potential for benefits from reducing 
emissions from deforestation 
Low potential for benefits from 
reforestation activities and CDM 
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As India’s deforestation rate has been stabilised over the time, and forest cover increased by 
4.75% on net from 1997 to 2007 (MoEF, 2009), it becomes clear that REDD policy did not sufficiently 
cater to India’s interests unless forest conservation and enhancement activities are included in the 
scope of the mechanism (Paul and Chakrabarti, 2011; Basu and Nayak, 2011). India proactively 
argued that the high opportunity cost associated with the stabilisation, maintenance and 
conservation of forest cover must also be recognised (Potvin and Bovarnik, 2008; MoEF, 2009).  In 
one of the interviews, an Indian expert mentioned that: 
“REDD+ may not be that lucrative for India in terms of money but has immense capacity to 
mitigate climate change along with bringing multiple co-benefits. Maybe India sees REDD+ 
as an opportunity to get external and additional funding for performing its national climate 
change mitigation tasks such as Green India Mission.” 
A study conducted by Pant (2009), used a SWOT (Strength Weakness Opportunities and Threat) 
analysis technique along with quantitative trend analysis of forest degradation to assess the 
potential for REDD in India. The study concludes that the “success of REDD+ in India lies primarily in 
the ''plus'' component, i.e., projects based on conservation and enhancement of carbon stocks and 
reducing emissions from degradation in specific regions.” 
Our analysis based on the key interviews and the available literature6 on India vis-à-vis REDD 
policy conform with the previous studies, where India showed interest in REDD discourse primarily 
to pursue the “Plus” component within REDD. The next section explains India’s interest in REDD+ as 
seen from the relative gains perspective.  
4.2. India’s responsiveness to relative gains concerns 
From 1995 until 2010, India faced three alternatives7, which it could primarily pursue while 
participating in the REDD policy discourse: 
1) India could accept REDD as it was initially formulated i.e., focused solely on deforestation and 
forest degradation. 
2) Abandon REDD altogether and not participate in the REDD discourse. 
3) Use soft power strategies to remodel REDD and include the “plus” component, i.e., the 
conservation and enhancement of carbon stock and the sustainable management of forests. 
Of the three options, the third was the most beneficial; the first option could have been a last 
resort, whereas the second could have brought loss in absolute terms. For India to have taken the 
first option and accepted REDD unconditionally as outlined in COP 13 would have reflected an 
insensitivity to relative gain concerns. However, by taking the third option, i.e., rejecting the initial 
REDD mechanism and reconfiguring it to include the “plus” component, India clearly demonstrated 
a keen sensitivity to relative gain concerns, i.e., to the fear that REDD would disproportionately 
benefit other developing countries, which could possibly become detriment to the Indian “emerging 
global power” projection.  
                                                      
6 The documents analyzed for this purpose, accessed between September 2010 to March, 2011, were 
mainly from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, http://moef.nic.in ;  COP 13 
agreement of the UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.2; COP 15 agreement of the UNFCCC, 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf; COP 16 agreement of the UNFCCC, 
unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf; India’s submission to the UNFCCC on long-
term co-operative actions, unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/indiasharedvisionv2.pdf;  India’s 
REDD+ submission to the UNFCCC,  moef.nic.in/downloads/home/UNFCCC-final.pdf 
7 This section is drawn from Mastanduno, 1991, in which the America's response to Japanese industrial 
policy is studied keeping the ‘relative gains concern’ in consideration, see Michael Mastanduno, “Do relative 
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India’s preference for the third option also clearly reflects India’s relative gain seeking 
behaviour. Instead of limiting REDD benefits to other countries, India sought to co-operate with a 
focus on absolute gains. Hence India consciously sought to change the REDD mechanism to 
maximise the benefits in its own favour (see Table 3 and 4). By convincing the global community to 
accept the “plus” component, India opened the possibility for harnessing the financial benefits of 
the REDD+ mechanism. 
In this context and in light of the realist argument put forth earlier, we argue that India 
exhibited relative gain-seeking behaviour, took advantage of any opportunity to emerge as a major 
player in the REDD negotiations and, to a great extent, failed the attempts of other rising powers, 
such as Brazil, to dominate the REDD discourse at the global level. 
4.3. India’s use of ‘soft power’ to remodel REDD to REDD+  
By advocating for ‘compensated conservation’ approach, India used ethics-based (equity and 
justice) negotiation tactics throughout the REDD discourse. India strategically participated in all the 
technical and methodological workshops (SBSTAs of the UNFCCC) and related meetings worldwide 
to form various negotiating blocs/coalitions and succeeded in gradually developing consensus 
around the idea of a “plus” component and having that component included in the REDD agreement 
at COP-16, in 2010. 
In this section, we discuss how India adopted the soft power strategy to promote its 
‘compensated conservation’ proposal with regard to the inclusion of forests in mitigating the global 
emissions. The idea of compensated conservation eventually became reality in the current REDD-
Plus mechanism. Figure 3 shows the network of themes emerged in the analysis. In our analysis we 
found that there were some key soft power strategies that were used by India to pursue its interest.   
They are discussed as below: 
1) Self Image promotion: In all the major documents generated by the Indian MoEF8, on REDD and 
related issues, it is evident that India projected its domestic policies as being pro-conservation. 
India boasted about its increase in forest cover over the 1995-2005 period. India also highlighted 
its commitment to community participation in forest management (such as the Joint Forest 
Management mechanism widely spread and functional across the nation (see e.g. Paul and 
Chakrabarti, 2011; Misra and Kant, 2004; Behera and Engel, 2006). The example of ‘self-image 
promotion’ evident in several documents is: “Over the past decades, national policies of India 
aimed at conservation and sustainable management of forests have transformed India’s forests 
into a net sink of CO2 (Box 1 No.10, Kishwan et al.2009) 
2) Leadership from the outside-in: In the context of this paper, this strategy relates to the “indirect 
exertion of soft power” through the structural circulation of India’s REDD+ proposal at political 
discussions (e.g., SBSTA meetings) aligned with its ally countries (Chong, 2007:7). 
3) Network–effect strategy: This strategy pertains to India’s quest to establish networks on the basis 
of a common reference point (Lee, 2009), i.e., REDD is skewed in favour of high forest high 
deforestation (HFHD) countries. This strategy helped to create an external environment 
favourable to India’s ‘compensated conservation’ proposal. Additionally, the inclusion of new 
technical terms in the REDD discourse, such as replacing the concept of sustainable management 
of forests with sustainable forest management, gained support for India from forestry networks 
surrounding e.g. UN-FAO9 and smoothed the reception of India’s proposal at the negotiation 
table (see Table 3).  
4) Alliance: India’s global effort to make alliances in the form of “international groupings” is notable, 
and the most relevant of these groupings in the climate change arena was the BASIC (Brazil, 
South Africa India and China) bloc. It played prominent role during COP 15 in Copenhagen. The 
main agenda of BASIC coalition was to put off the pressures from the United States of America 
                                                      
8 These documents are the official statements, presentations, briefs, working papers etc on India’s stand 
and viewpoint on REDD and REDD+ published on behalf of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
Government of India. http://moef.nic.in 
9 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
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to commit to  fixed emission reduction targets and deciding on the peaking year of the 
emissions. The other strategic partnerships also exist, such as BRIC, Brazil-India (Skak, 2011), 
Brazil-India-South Africa trilateralism (Stuenkel, 2010), etc. These engagements of India in strong 
multilateral groupings indicate not only its soft power approach (Alden and Vieira, 2005) but also 
its shift in diplomatic focus from the G-77 to the G-20 and the G-8plus5; this shift further explains 
the proactive behaviour of India in climate change politics. Since 2010, India has constantly 
worked to change its image from a climate laggard to a climate leader (Rastogi, 2011) and India 
has borne the fruit of such efforts in the form of strong support from the USA and Russia for 
India’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council (Skak, 2011). 
 
Figure 3: Network of emerging key themes 
 
 
Our analysis provides good insight on why and how India played a significant role in REDD 
negotiations. However, we must be cautious in drawing conclusions without recognizing the 
limitations of this study. Firstly, the amount of data limits the scope of our study. More key 
informant interviews, especially during an on-going REDD event could have allowed for more robust  
and comparative analysis. But due to time constraint we rely only on two key informants along with 
document analysis. Secondly, as many of documents used for this research are published by the 
MoEF, Government of India for the international audience, it limits the scope for understanding any 
hidden interest in REDD +  for example interest in REDD+ may be motivated by the opportunity to 
increase recentralization of forest management. Thirdly, we should make a note that the consensus 
on adding the “plus” in REDD mechanism could have been facilitated by the global community to 
avoid “international leakage” associated with the REDD mechanism. International leakage may 
occur when reduction of emissions in one country (due to the REDD+ implementation) may lead to 
an increase in emissions in another country. In other words, leakage is simply an emission 
displacement and to avoid such leakage, participation of as many countries possible is required to 
implement the REDD+ policy and projects simultaneously. Thus including a broad scope of activities 
in The REDD mechanism allows for the maximum number of developing countries to operate within 
the REDD mechanism. Nevertheless, the role of India to push for the ‘plus’ in the REDD agenda 
cannot be underestimated.  
Based on the findings of our paper, we argue that India played a proactive role in putting across 
its specific interest in REDD mechanism. Our findings are although specific to its role in REDD 
negotiations, they strongly conform to the studies focused on India’s broad role in global climate 
politics. India has used equity-based arguments to put strong emphasis on ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)’ (Rajan, 1997; Barua, 2017), which means that developing and 
developed countries should have different levels of obligations and responsibilities to reducing 
Forest and Society. Vol. 2(1):47-64, April 2018 59 
 
greenhouse gas emissions. In the literature, it is evident that India sought an important role for itself 
in global climate negotiations (Jakobsen, 1999; Sengupta, 2012; Dröge & Wagner, 2015).  
5. Conclusion 
The literature on global environmental politics is influenced largely by the neoliberal 
institutionalist literature (Elliot, 1998; Stripple, 2006;). The literature however also indicates the use 
of regime theory (see Hasenclever et al., 1996), constructivist theory (see Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994; 
Paterson, 2006) and realism (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010) to understand global politics around 
pressing environmental issues. In the literature, especially pertaining to climate change politics, the 
use of interest-based theories have been widely used to explore the role of countries in pursuing 
climate change discourse and joining international agreements (Purdon, 2014). However, most 
studies focus on the economic aspect of climate diplomacy and assume that the countries are 
motivated to cooperate in international agreement countries because of the absolute gains to make 
them better off than the other countries (Ike, 2016). In this paper we, however argued that power 
is a relative concept (Dahl, 1969) and so the concern over relative gains to preserve the pre-existing 
balance of power along with absolute gains steers the international agreements related to climate 
change (Grieco, 1988). Countries that are in the leadership race, aiming for the underlying goal of 
enhancing their regional and/or global power in an international system have a lot at stake in the 
politics of global climate change (Motaal, 2010). However, unlike national security, the stakes in the 
climate change discourse are not high enough to warrant the use of hard power within realism. 
Hence, the concepts of high and low politics (Willets, 2001) are too narrow for this empirical 
application. The case of climate change politics suggests that the concepts should be widened into 
a continuum from low politics to high politics to high security politics.  
In essence our study suggests that strong states, such as BRICS, at ease seem to be capable of 
joining an on going international regime and its policy deliberations, to which they had not been 
members or addressees in a first place. In addition, such strong emerging states, in case they attain 
sufficient issue–related (soft) power, are even capable of substantially remodelling a strongly 
evolving policy paradigm, such as REDD, into a quite different approach more in line with their 
interests. It remains unclear, however, if the Indian intervention alone is a sufficient explanation, or 
if similar interventions by e.g. China had been necessary to provide the issue-specific power required 
for the remodelling from REDD to REDD+.  The observed appropriation of international processes 
and policies in the pursuit of political self-interests has in the literature been termed “customization” 
of international regimes (Thomann, 2015; Giessen, forthcoming, Logmani et al., 2017). The 
processes through which such customizations are achieved, however, will need more in-depth 
scrutiny in the future. 
In our paper, we analysed how India played a major role in expanding the REDD global climate 
change mitigation policy to REDD+. India pursued its national interest in gaining benefits from REDD 
along with its (latent) goal of establishing itself as one of the significant leaders in climate politics. 
This reflects India’s realist outlook in the international system. India showed its concern for the 
relative gains associated with REDD and actively participated in the discourse from SBSTA 24 (2006) 
to the present. India’s agenda on the international stage has been clear, and India has reiterated its 
demand for the treatment of ‘plus’ at par with deforestation and forest degradation. Recent studies 
claim that India used hard and soft strategies such as proposing new solutions in the common 
interest, along with “strong morally loaded arguments on fairness and responsibility, and high 
opening demands on industrialised countries carrying all the cost are typical characteristics of India’s 
traditional defensive, distributive strategy, while obviously being in India’s self-interest.” 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011: 6). 
Our findings suggest that India was not only responsive to relative gains concerns but also 
exhibited clear relative gain-seeking behaviour. India initiated its participation in REDD discourse 
because of its concern over losing potential REDD funds to other developing countries. Nevertheless, 
India embarked on the opportunity by proposing a rather new approach of ‘compensated 
conservation’, which translated to the REDD+ policy, hence remodelling it from its earlier structure. 
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This has provided India with two main benefits: potential REDD funds and the enhancement of its 
image as a powerful actor in climate politics.  
Additionally, India sought an alliance in the form of the BASIC bloc, which not only gave a 
common platform to resolve contentious REDD issues with Brazil but also provided one to advance 
its climate agenda with the support of other emerging economies. This coalition highlights the soft 
balancing strategy of the major economies in climate negotiations. Here, soft balancing strategy 
refers to forming the alliance with other major economies for putting away the pressure from the 
USA to commit to the emission reduction targets, without any major confrontation. 
India’s leading effort to include the “plus” component in the REDD agenda was successful at  
COP 16 in Cancun in 2010 and the UNFCCC parties acceded to the REDD+ agreement (see Cancun 
agreement on REDD+; FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1). This shows how India utilised soft power strategies 
in the process of pursuing its interests without having any major confrontations with the global 
community.  
For the purpose of this paper, we utilized the neo-realist concept of relative gains along with 
the theoretical concept of soft power. It provided a good point of departure for examining India’s 
role in climate change politics. However, the scope of this paper is limited to examine only a small 
segment of India’s role in ‘forest and climate change discourse’ within the overall climate 
governance. We believe, further research is required to undertake on India’s role in other sectors of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation to gain deeper perspective on India’s role in climate 
governance, which is although pacing up yet not fully realised.   
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